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Jennifer L. King'
I. INTRODUCTION
"First comes love, then comes marriage . " Not necessarily.
This old jump rope chant may now have a new twist: "First comes
love, then comes cohabitation." And why not? After all, this is the
'90s. For many couples, marriage is no longer the only option when
considering life together. What is marriage anyway but a piece of
paper from the state, or a blessing from a religious institution from
which many have either grown away or with which many had no
connection at all? As society's views of cohabitation have changed, so
have the ways that Washington courts treat property held by couples
in cohabitational relationships.'
To understand the significance of these changes, it is important
to analyze the treatment of marital property under Washington's
* J.D. Candidate 1997, Seattle University School of Law; B.S. 1992, Linfield College. I
give special thanks to my husband, Stephen R. King (The Stephen King to me), for his love and
support. I would also like to thank the following people for their help in editing this Comment:
Professor William C. Oltman, Susan P. Flynn, Thomas Leahy, Scott Sleight, Andrea Denton,
Shelly Speir and all the Seattle University Law Review members who worked on this Comment.
1. As used in this Comment, "cohabitational" shall refer to a family-like nonmarital
relationship between a man and a woman. The term "meretricious" will only be used in this
Comment when quoted in authority. Most recent cases contain a footnote recognizing that the
term "meretricious" is a historically demeaning and sexist term derived from the Latin word
"meretrix," meaning "prostitute." However, with apologies, these cases continue to use the word
because it has been given a legally recognizable definition over time. Not finding this reasoning
particularly compelling for the use of such a derogatory term, and because this is not a court
opinion, I will instead use the term "cohabitational" to refer to what has been referred to as"meretricious." It is interesting to note that many of the same issues that arise in cohabitational
relationships may also arise in same-sex relationships; however, that is not the focus of this
Comment.
2. Although a common law marriage may not be created in Washington, if a common law
marriage is created elsewhere, Washington will recognize it as a valid marriage. In re Gallagher's
Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 512, 213 P.2d 621 (1950). Because an out-of-state common law marriage
is viewed as a valid legal marriage in Washington, this type of relationship shall be treated the
same as marriage in this Comment.
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community property law. Generally, community property law provides
that when a man and a woman marry, they are treated as a type of
partnership.3 Equality forms the basis of this legal relationship: All
wealth acquired by either spouse during the marriage is shared due to
the presumption that each spouse contributed to the prosperity of the
marriage. It naturally follows that each spouse acquires an equal right
to the property after the community (partnership) terminates.4
In promoting the general principle of equality, Washington law
recognizes certain rules and presumptions. For instance, property
acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property.'
When separate property is commingled with community property, it
becomes community property; when one spouse incurs an obligation,
the community is presumed obligated.6  Also, agreements that
disaffirm. community property are subject to a higher standard of proof
than those that affirm community property.7 Although most married
couples do not know the particulars of these rules and presumptions,
they do know that saying "I do" will subject their property to a
panoply of statutory rules upon death or dissolution.
Unlike married couples, until recently, cohabitants could not
expect Washington courts to apply the rules and presumptions found
in community property statutes.8 In fact, courts historically refused
to apply any special considerations to cohabitants at all. This view was
embodied by a rule of law that reigned for over thirty-six years: the
"Creasman presumption."9 This presumption held that, absent any
evidence to the contrary, the way property was titled at the end of a
cohabitational relationship was presumed to be the way the parties
intended.10
However, beginning with the 1984 case of In re Marriage of
Lindsey,1 the distinction between courts' treatment of marriage and
cohabitation began to blur. With Lindsey, the Washington Supreme
3. Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law In Washington, 61 WASH. L. REV. 13,
18 (1986).
4. Id. at 18 n.7.
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (West 1996).
6. Id.
7. Cross, supra note 3, at 19.
8. Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951). See also In re Sloan's Estate,
50 Wash. 86, 90, 96 P. 684, 685 (1908); WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON
COMMUNITY PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 2.60 (2d ed. 1989).
9. Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 355, 196 P.2d 835, 841 (1948).
10. Id.
11. 101 Wash. 2d 299; 678 P.2d 328 (1984).
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Court overruled the Creasman presumption.12 In its place, the
Lindsey court adopted a rule requiring a "just and equitable" disposi-
tion of cohabitational property based on the nature of the relationship
and the nature of the property.13 This rule was derived from direct
analogy to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute, Revised Code
of Washington (RCW) 26.09.080, which lists the factors a court is
instructed to use in dividing up a couple's property upon the dissolu-
tion of their marriage."
Analogizing to the marriage statute for cohabitational relationships
is neither wise nor necessary. Statutory analogy is not wise because the
scope of the analogy is unclear and therefore can lead to ad hoc
decisions and judicial legislation. In addition, statutory analogy is
unnecessary because the courts had managed to "do equity" for
cohabitating couples by using various equitable means to get around
the Creasman presumption.
The Washington Supreme Court's most recent decision dealing
with property distribution after cohabitation, Connell v. Francisco,"5
demonstrates two problems of scope in applying the "just and
equitable" statutory analogy. First, should a court refer to all of the
"just and equitable" dissolution statute by considering both the"separate" and the "community" property of a cohabitational relation-
ship when making a just and equitable distribution?16 Second,
because the "just and equitable" dissolution statute is interdependent
with other marital statutes,17 can it be meaningfully applied by
analogy without also applying other marital statutes by analogy?
12. Id.
13. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 331.
14. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 332. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (West 1996) provides in
pertinent part:
In a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage ... the court shall, without regard to
marital misconduct, make such disposition of the property and the liabilities of the
parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable after
considering all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of the
property is to become effective....
Id.
15. 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831 (1995).
16. See, e.g., Connell v. Francisco, 74 Wash. App. 306, 872 P.2d 1150 (1994); Zion
Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore, 78 Wash. App. 87, 895 P.2d 864 (1995).
17. For example, the community property statutes, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.010-.030,
contain the definitions of "separate" and "community" property.
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Even if the problems with the scope of the "just and equitable"
statutory analogy can be solved, such a solution is not necessary
because of the continuing availability of the equitable means that were
used prior to Lindsey. Both Lindsey and Connell gave the Creasman
presumption more credit as a nemesis than it deserved. The Creasman
presumption was an ineffectual vestige of a bygone time. The last time
the Creasman presumption was applied was in the Creasman case itself.
Virtually every appellate or Supreme Court case between Creasman and
Lindsey dealing with the distribution of property after a cohabitational
relationship cited Creasman almost by rote, and then found that the
presumption did not apply.'" Instead, the courts used various
equitable means to get around Creasman.
Because Creasman was not used, the Lindsey court's overruling of
Creasman did not make property distributions after cohabitation any
more equitable. Lindsey's analogy to the marriage statutes merely adds
18. See Hinde v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 770, 575 P.2d 711, 712 (1978) (not
confronted with Creasman because court did not believe the relationship was "meretricious," but
court did give the property as titled in accordance with equity and Creasman); Latham v.
Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 552, 554 P.2d 1057, 1058 (1976) (not within Creasman because
evidence showed that parties intended title to be in decedent's name); In re Estate of Thornton,
81 Wash. 2d 72, 79, 499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972) (not within Creasman because there was evidence
sufficient to make out a prima facie case for implied partnership); Humphries v. Riveland, 67
Wash. 2d 376, 386, 407 P.2d 967, 972 (1965) (not within Creasman because of evidence that the
parties had discussed the possibility of titling the property in both their names, but because this
was not done, it was evidence that they intended it to be titled as it was); West v. Knowles, 50
Wash. 2d 311, 313, 311 P.2d 689, 691 (1957) (not within Creasman because both parties were
alive and testified as to their intent); Iredell v. Iredell, 49 Wash. 2d 627, 629-30, 305 P.2d 805,
807 (1957) (not within Creasman because there was evidence to a contrary intent of ownership);
Dahigren v. Blomeen, 49 Wash. 2d 47, 53-54, 298 P.2d 479, 482-83 (1956) (not within Creasman
because there was a written agreement for consideration to will property); Lalley v. Lalley, 43
Wash. 2d 192, 195, 260 P.2d 905, 907 (1953) (not within Creasman because relationship was not
considered "meretricious"); Poole, 39 Wash. 2d at 561-62, 236 P.2d at 1047 (not within Creasman
because rights stemmed from joint venture or partnership relationship that was not altered by the
cohabitational relationship); Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 813-14, 232 P.2d 827, 830
(1951) (not within Creasman because parties were alive and testimony showed intent); Warden
v. Warden, 36 Wash. App. 693, 695, 676 P.2d 1037, 1037, rev. denied, 101 Wash. 2d 1016
(1984) (case decided the same time as Lindsey; rejects Creasman and decides based on just and
equitable standards); DeLaGarza v. Rennebohm, 24 Wash. App. 575, 577, 602 P.2d 372, 373
(1979) (Creasman presumption cited, but not central to issue of case, which was whether a change
of venue from the county in which property was located was appropriate in a dissolution of a"meretricious relationship and/or common-law marriage" action); Adams v. Jensen-Thomas, 18
Wash. App. 757, 761-62, 571 P.2d 958, 961-62 (1977) (not within Creasman because relationship
was not "meretricious" because man was still living with his wife); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash.
App. 386, 392, 523 P.2d 957, 960-61 (1974) (not within Creasman because the court held there
was a constructive trust); Proctor v. Forsythe, 4 Wash. App. 238, 240, 480 P.2d 511, 513 (1971)
(not within Creasman because relationship was not "meretricious" because man was still living
with his wife). But see In re Marriage of Rhoads, 645 P.2d 1153, 1154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982)
(court said Creasman applied, but logic of the case does not show that court really used Creasman).
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another layer of complication to an area of law that had functioned
quite well using equitable means to avoid the Creasman presumption.
Connell demonstrates that statutory analogy will lead to more unpre-
dictability as courts attempt to determine the exact scope of that
analogy. The "exceptions" to the Creasman presumption should be the
rule to ensure the flexibility required by equity in these types of cases,
while keeping distinct the lines between marriage and cohabitation.
To promote this thesis, Part II discusses the facts of Creasman and
then dispels the myth of importance surrounding its presumption. Part
III reviews the facts of Lindsey, looks at whether cohabitation and
marriage can ever be analogous, then attempts to identify trends and
find predictability in the cases between Lindsey and Connell. Part IV
summarizes the facts of Connell and concludes that statutory analogy
produces no better results than existing equitable doctrines, while
leading to much greater unpredictability. Finally, Part V argues that
the Creasman "exceptions" offer an equitable and more predictable way
of distributing cohabitational property in a manner that meets the
expectations of the cohabitants without infringing upon the legal
relationship of marriage.
II. CREASMAN: THE PRESUMPTION THAT WASN'T
From 1939 until her death in 1946, Caroline Paul and Harvey
Creasman cohabitated as "husband" and "wife." Caroline was
Caucasian and Harvey was African-American. During Caroline and
Harvey's cohabitation, Caroline, in her name only, contracted to
purchase land occupied by a dilapidated shack and established a bank
account. Harvey's wages from his work in the Bremerton Navy Yard
provided for the couple's living needs, including payments on the real
estate contract, home improvements, and the purchase of savings
bonds. Caroline maintained the home and managed the money
(generally in her name), thus allowing the couple's assets to grow.
When Caroline died, Harvey claimed entitlement to the home,
household goods, and savings account. The trial court awarded half
of the claimed property to Harvey and half to Caroline's estate. Both
Harvey's and Caroline's administrators appealed."9
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court cited the rule that, in
the absence of a trust relationship, property acquired by parties during
cohabitation belonged to the party in whom the legal title stood.2"
19. Creasman, 31 Wash. 2d at 350-51, 196 P.2d at 836-37.
20. Id. at 351, 196 P.2d at 838 (citing Engstrom v. Peterson, 107 Wash. 523, 530, 182 P.
623, 625 (1919); Hynes v. Hynes, 28 Wash. 2d 660, 671, 184 P.2d 68, 74 (1947)).
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The court then rejected Harvey's resulting trust theory,21 concluding
that the property was titled as the parties had intended.22 In terms
reflective of the moral climate of the day, the court stated that "[t]he
contract between them, if any there was ... was simply an agreement
or arrangement for a protracted illicit cohabitation, originated in
premeditation and carried out in accordance with their deliberate choice
and design. ' '23 Further, the court stated that the case was illustrative
of a situation "where this court can, and should, declare that it will
leave the parties exactly where it finds them with respect to their
property.... 24
These comments, and the rejection of the resulting trust theory,
led the court to declare the Creasman presumption: "[U]nder these
circumstances and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it
should be presumed as a matter of law that the parties intended to
dispose of the property exactly as they did dispose of it."25
The Creasman presumption ostensibly ruled for thirty-six years
until overruled by Lindsey. It is possible that the Creasman presump-
tion was used at the trial court level to decide cohabitational property
disputes with cool efficiency. At the appellate and Supreme Court
levels, however, this did not occur. In only one appellate case, In re
Marriage of Rhoads,26 did the court claim to base its holding on the
Creasman presumption, but that court's stated reliance on the
presumption was questionable.27 In other cases between Creasman
21. Creasman, 31 Wash. 2d at 354-55, 196 P.2d at 839-40. Harvey asserted that because
the property was paid for with his earnings but held in Caroline's name, Caroline was merely
holding legal title subject to his equitable ownership. In a resulting trust, the consideration for
the purchase of the property is made solely by the equitable owner and the party with legal title
must have no beneficial interest in the property. Scott v. Currie, 7 Wash. 2d 301, 307, 109 P.2d
526, 529 (1941). The Creasman court stated that the founding principle of a resulting trust is the
parties' presumed intention to create a trust, and the facts and circumstances here reasonably
indicated no such intention, but rather a contrary intention. This conclusion was buttressed by
the fact that Harvey and Caroline were "considerably more than 'domestic strangers' to each
other." They had held themselves out as husband and wife and had acquired the property with
full knowledge that they were not married; therefore, the court inferred that they had been
deliberate in the tidling of the property. Further, Caroline had contributed to the acquired
property by her domestic efforts and had enjoyed the use of the property; she thus had a
beneficial interest in the property and the property ownership did not fit the resulting trust model.
Creasman, 31 Wash. 2d at 352-57, 196 P.2d at 839-41.
22. Id. at 355, 196 P.2d at 841.
23. Id. at 353, 196 P.2d at 839.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 355, 196 P.2d at 841.
26. 645 P.2d 1153 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
27. The Rhoads case dealt primarily with the distribution of a residence in a divorce action,
which was purchased by the husband prior to marriage while the parties were living together.
Although the court cited Creasman as the rule, it then went on to affirm the trial court's finding
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and Lindsey, courts cited the Creasman presumption, but then found
that it did not apply and instead based their holdings on various other
reasons, including, inter alia, resulting trust, constructive trust, joint
venture, implied partnership, tracing, joint tenancy, express and
implied contract, and clear evidence of the intent of the parties."
Some courts also found that the relationship did not qualify as"meretricious."29
An example of how the Washington Supreme Court used one of
the "Creasman exceptions"30 is found in In re Estate of Thornton.31
In that case, when a sixteen-year cohabitational relationship ended by
the death of the male cohabitant, the court found the evidence
sufficient to make out a prima facie case of implied partnership.32
Implied partnership depends on the intention of the parties as
ascertained from all facts, circumstances, actions and conduct of the
parties.33 The couple in Thornton had engaged in a cattle ranching
enterprise on real estate owned by the man. The female cohabitant
had contributed to the success of the business venture. In that case,
of fact that the residence was the husband's separate property for reasons unrelated to the
Creasman presumption. Those reasons included the fact that the woman had very little
involvement in the decision to purchase the home and that the man made the down payment with
his separate funds and paid off the loan on the property with his salary prior to marriage. The
man had borrowed $2,000 from the woman's separate funds to make some of those payments, but
he had repaid her prior to their marriage. Id. at 1154.
28. See, e.g., Walberg, 38 Wash. 2d at 813, 232 P.2d at 830-31 (finding resulting trust);
Omer, 11 Wash. App. at 393, 523 P.2d at 961 (finding constructive trust); Poole, 39 Wash. 2d
at 565, 236 P.2d at 1049 (finding joint venture); Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d at 75, 499 P.2d at 865-66
(finding implied partnership); West, 50 Wash. 2d at 313, 311 P.2d at 691 (applying tracing to
determine property ownership because both parties were alive and testified as to their intent);
Shull, 63 Wash. 2d at 504, 387 P.2d at 768; Dahlgren, 49 Wash. 2d at 54, 298 P.2d at 483;
Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 553, 554 P.2d at 1059.
29. E.g., Proctor, 4 Wash. App. at 240, 480 P.2d at 513. See also In re Relationship of
Eggers, 30 Wash. App. 867, 873, 638 P.2d 1267, 1271 (1982); Adams, 18 Wash. App. at 762,
571 P.2d at 961-62. A "meretricious" relationship was defined in Latham as a long-term, stable,
nonmarital family relationship. 87 Wash. 2d at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059. The relevant factors for
the court to use in ascertaining whether a long-term, stable, nonsmarital family relationship exists
are: (1) continuous cohabitation, (2) duration of the relationship, (3) purpose of the relationship,
and (4) the pooling of resources and services for joint projects. Id. If a "meretricious"
relationship is found, then it is reasonable for the court to assume that each member in some way
contributed to the acquisition of the property. Id.
30. Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 553-54, 554 P.2d at 1059. The Adams court pointed out that
the word "exception" is confusing because the Creasman presumption was not conclusive, but
rebuttable by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas an exception is required only to
circumvent a conclusive presumption. 18 Wash. App. at 761 n.5, 571 P.2d at 960 n.5. At the
risk of technical imprecision, this Comment will refer to the "Creasman exceptions" when
discussing the equitable means used to avoid the Creasman presumption.
31. 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
32. Id. at 80, 499 P.2d at 868.
33. Id. at 79, 499 P.2d at 867-68.
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the-court was able to provide a remedy for the woman, where the
Creasman presumption would have precluded the woman from
claiming anything from the man's estate.
Thornton, and the numerous other cases using the Creasman
exceptions, show that the Creasman presumption carried little
substance at the appellate and Supreme Court levels. But there may
have been other reasons favoring Creasman's rejection. By Lindsey,
Creasman was criticized for relying on unacknowledged facts: in
particular, Caroline and Harvey were a racially mixed couple living
together in the 1940s.34 Further, if the Creasman presumption was
used at the trial court level on cases that were not appealed for any
number of reasons (e.g., cost or social stigma), that use could have
added significantly to the presumption's poor reputation. It is no
wonder that, by Lindsey, Creasman was perceived as a harsh, old-
fashioned rule that could be altered only by a drastic change in the law.
III. LINDSEY AND STATUTORY ANALOGY
Aside from whether Lindsey's overruling of Creasman was
necessary, the fact remains that Lindsey changed the law in Washing-
ton. Courts now must look at the property of the cohabitants and the
nature of the relationship to make a "just and equitable" distribution
of cohabitational property. On its face, Lindsey's dictates appear
reasonable, and statutory analogy appears to be the cure for the
perceived harshness of the Creasman presumption. However, when the
Lindsey rationale is fully analyzed and the public policy issues explored,
Lindsey has not improved this area of the law because the scope of
Lindsey's statutory analogy is not clear. Statutory analogy is therefore
unpredictable. Further, Lindsey's statutory analogy should lead us to
conclude that the court has overstepped its bounds by performing the
task of deciding society's values regarding cohabitation.
This Part familiarizes the reader with why the Lindsey court
adopted a rule analogous to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute.
This Part then addresses the public policy issue of whether statutory
analogy of cohabitation to marriage is desirable or workable, with the
aim of stimulating some "big-picture" thinking before beginning the
more detail-oriented discussion of how Lindsey has been interpreted.
Finally, it attempts to find guidance as to Lindsey's scope in the cases
34. See, e.g., West, 50 Wash. 2d at 318-19, 311 P.2d at 693-94 (citing a Texas law review
article which criticized Creasman's result as racist and sexist); Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d at 77-78,
499 P.2d at 866-67 (implying that Creasman reflected the court's perception of the moral status
of cohabitation).
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between Lindsey and Connell. From this endeavor, the theory is posed
that courts are actually using the Creasman exceptions and are simply
labeling this use as statutory analogy.
A. In re Marriage of Lindsey
1. Facts and Holding of Lindsey
By 1984, the Washington Supreme Court was ready to overrule
Creasman35 and the court believed In re Marriage of Lindsey was just
the case to do this.36 Lindsey involved a dissolution action between
Lana and Carl Lindsey. Prior to their five-year marriage, Lana and
Carl lived together for two years. Primarily at issue was the distribu-
tion of approximately $85,000 in fire insurance proceeds received when
a barn/shop burned down. The barn was built by the couple during
their cohabitation.
After performing a "Just and equitable" division of the community
assets acquired during marriage, the trial court discussed what should
be done with the assets acquired during the couple's cohabitational
relationship. Applying the Creasman presumption, the trial court
awarded Carl, inter alia, all of the fire insurance proceeds. Lana
appealed, claiming the trial court erred by applying Creasman.
On appeal, the Lindsey court expressly overruled the Creasman
presumption, stating that the rule in application had been restricted to
the facts of Creasman.37 Further, the court recognized that many
methods had been used to avoid application of the Creasman presump-
tion." The court then concluded that Creasman had been expanded
beyond its intended scope (those facts just like Creasman), and its"constricting dictates ... have made the law unpredictable and at
times onerous."' 9
In Creasman's place, the Lindsey court stated the current rule that
"courts must 'examine the [meretricious] relationship and the property
accumulations and make a just and equitable disposition of the
property."'40 Facially, this language easily could be read as a
validation of the Creasman "exceptions" as the new rule. However, the
35. See Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d at 77-78, 499 P.2d at 867. See also Latham, 87 Wash. 2d
at 553-54, 554 P.2d at 1060. In dicta, the court questioned the Creasman presumption's
application to facts other than that of Creasman and noted that Thornton had been dubious about
the continuing validity of the presumption. Id.
36. Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 304, 678 P.2d at 331.
37. Id. at 302, 678 P.2d at 330.
38. Id. at 303-04, 678 P.2d at 330-31.
39. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 331.
40. Id. (quoting Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059).
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citations following the above-quoted rule support the conclusion that
Lindsey intended to analogize to the "just and equitable" dissolution
statute. Specifically, the Lindsey court cited directly to the dissolution
statute following the stated rule by writing "Cf. RCW 26.09.080."41
"Cf." means: "Cited authority supports a proposition different from the
main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support. '4 2 Further
support that the Lindsey court intended to analogize to the "just and
equitable" dissolution statute is found in the wording of the Lindsey
rule itself, which parallels the wording of RCW 26.09.080. 43 Despite
this evidence that Lindsey intended that property distributions
following cohabitational relationships should be dealt with in terms
that are analogous to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute,
Lindsey offered no guidance as to whether both "separate" and"community" cohabitational property should be considered, or whether
other marital statutes should also be applied by analogy.
2. What was Lindsey Trying to Accomplish?
In essence, the Lindsey court overruled Creasman because it found
"the constricting dictates of the Creasman presumption to have made
the law unpredictable and at times onerous."" It may be inferred that
the Lindsey court was concerned that any rule for the distribution of
cohabitational property should be predictable and equitable.
Lindsey's concern with equity was that the law in this area not be
onerous.4" Something is said to be "onerous" when "the obligations
attaching to it unreasonably counterbalance or exceed the advantage to
be derived from it .... Unreasonably burdensome or one-sided."46
Equity seems to be the antithesis of onerousness. The adoption of the"just and equitable" approach ostensibly fits with Lindsey's goal of
eliminating Creasman's perceived harsh, onerous results. However,
considering that Creasman was probably only applied in unappealed
trial court cases, and considering the equitable nature of the Creasman
exceptions, there were, in theory, no harsh, onerous results to
eliminate. If the Lindsey court's goal was to alleviate harsh results at
the trial court level, this intent was not made clear. Nor does Lindsey
seem to take into account the Creasman exceptions.
41. Id. at 304, 678 P.2d at 331.
42. HARVARD LAW REVIEW ASS'N, A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 23 (16th ed.
1996) (emphasis added).
43. See supra note 14 for text of WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080.
44. Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 304, 678 P.2d at 331 (emphasis added).
45. Id.
46. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1088 (6th ed. 1990).
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As to the Lindsey court's conclusion that Creasman made the law
unpredictable, if one accepts the Lindsey court's assertion that
Creasman may be limited to its facts, then it follows that Creasman
could not make the entire law regarding disposition of property after
cohabitational relationships unpredictable. Assuming arguendo that
the Creasman presumption only applies to those cases involving
cohabitational relationships ended by death,47 the Creasman presump-
tion is easy to apply and is very predictable. Increasing this predict-
ability is the fact that a party can count on the presumption not being
applied at the appellate and supreme court levels, as established in Part
II of this Comment.
In contrast, Lindsey's statutory analogy creates unpredictability
because it only applies to those cohabitational relationships that are
deemed "stable, continuous family-type relationships."48  This
unpredictability is created in two ways. First, no bright-line rule exists
for determining when a relationship is a "stable, continuous family-
type relationship." Instead, that determination is dependent on a
rather indeterminate "factor" test. Second, once a relationship is
deemed a "stable, continuing family-type relationship," there is no
indication as to whether this designation is retroactive to the day the
couple moved in together, or even to the time when they may have
first started spending nights together.
It is extremely questionable whether Lindsey's statutory analogy
did anything to improve predictability in cohabitation cases. On the
contrary, as Connell later demonstrated, the courts are now forced to
determine which portions of the marriage statutes will apply and which
portions will not. Further, the courts are left to determine how the
equitable doctrines used as exceptions to Creasman interact with the
statutory analogy. Dividing property in cohabitation cases is less
predictable after Lindsey than before, while no additional equity has
been accomplished.
B. How Analogous is Cohabitation to Community Property Marriage?
In considering whether Lindsey's "just and equitable" rule is
appropriate, it is necessary to first consider the broad question of
whether cohabitation is (or should be) analogous to community
property marriage. This is the question that the Lindsey court's
47. See Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 302, 678 P.2d at 331.
48. Latham, 87 Wash. 2d at 554, 554 P.2d at 1059; Lindsey, 101 Wash. 2d at 305, 678 P.2d
at 331; Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 346, 898 P.2d at 834.
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analysis left untouched, and this is the question that will determine
whether Lindsey is correct at all.
Society's thinking about cohabitation has changed-maybe even
to the point where many are willing to socially put cohabitation on the
same level as marriage. However, society's thinking on this issue has
not changed to the point where Washington citizens are demanding
legislative changes to legally put cohabitation and marriage on the same
level. As Lindsey's application suggests, too many problems exist with
analogizing cohabitation to marriage in the law.49 The court should
not interject its view of whether cohabitation and marriage should be
legally analogous. Until Washington citizens demand legislative
changes, and until certain problems can be sufficiently addressed in
this area, the law regarding distribution of cohabitational property
should remain as it was pre-Lindsey, with the possible exception of
allowing for the overrule of Creasman."0
Whether cohabitation is analogous to marriage may be looked at
from two partially overlapping perspectives, or spheres: the social
sphere and legal sphere."1 This section first explores the social
sphere-looking at some of the social norms affecting the desirability
of analogizing cohabitation to community property marriage. Next,
this section explores the legal sphere-seeing how these social norms
interact with the process of legal decision making and examining
whether, within the legal sphere, analogizing cohabitation to communi-
ty property marriage is something our courts should do.
Today, cohabitation and marriage are often considered socially
similar. Nary an eyebrow is raised when a social invitation requests
that a guest bring his or her "significant other." However, over the
years, various reasons have been advanced to favor the institution of
49. See infra, Part III.C., "Interpreting Lindsey: Cases Between Lindsey and Connell" (the
scope of the analogy is unclear, and therefore unpredictable), and Part IV.C., "Beyond Connell"
(discussing problems of identifying the types of relationships subject to statutory analogy,
problems of when the relationship becomes subject to statutory analogy, and problems of differing
expectations among cohabitants).
50. What would remain would be the Creasman exceptions.
51. My use of "social" and "legal" spheres was inspired by the idea of marriage as a
"public" institution as expressed by Ellen Kandoian in COHABITATION, COMMON LAW
MARRIAGE, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SHARED MORAL LIFE, 75 Geo. L.J. 1929 (1987).
Kandoian describes marriage as both a "private" and a "public" institution. The private function
of marriage defines the relationship between two people. The public function of marriage defines
their relationship to the rest of society. Id.
This Comment does not consider Kandoian's idea of marriage as a private institution because
I believe such consideration cannot yield any practical conclusion. However, the idea that the
public function of marriage, and the analogy of cohabitation to marriage, has two further
overlapping aspects of "social" and "legal" is the idea I wish to explore here.
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marriage over cohabitational arrangements. First, marriage reflects our
traditional view of family life. Second, marriage is considered
necessary to legitimize the children born during a union; illegitimacy
still carries a certain amount of social stigma. Third, marriage is an
institution sanctioned and encouraged by religion, whereas most
mainstream religions consider cohabitation to be sinful.
Contrary to these and other traditional reasons for placing
marriage on a higher plane than cohabitation, society is now bombard-
ed with anecdotal evidence telling us there is little or no social
difference between marriage and cohabitation. Television and movie
characters cohabitate; celebrities cohabitate; our friends, neighbors, and
relatives cohabitate. This anecdotal evidence enables us to put a face
to those who cohabitate and, therefore, we may conclude that
cohabitating couples are not so different than married couples. It may
have been easier to accept social mores against cohabitation when those
mores were not often challenged-when cohabitation was considered
something in which only the "lower class" engaged. 2 Once the social
mores against cohabitation were challenged and society did not come
to an end, the traditional reasons for placing cohabitation on a level
well below marriage may have lost relevance.
Be this as it may, if we are asked the question, "Why have
marriage at all if cohabitation is easier, faster, and socially equal?" our
answer may be the somewhat illogical response, "Marriage is valued
and necessary because it just is." Even though society rationally may
see no distinction between marriage and cohabitation, deep down
society craves something more formal, perhaps something more
definable and more committed, than cohabitation.
Debates as to whether society is completely ready to treat marriage
and cohabitation the same socially could continue for years without
consensus. For the purposes of deciding whether Lindsey's statutory
analogy is correct, looking at the social sphere is a rather fruitless
exercise. However, the social sphere begins to overlap with the legal
sphere when we examine the practical aspects of Lindsey's analogy and
the process that is required to legally treat cohabitation the same as
marriage.
Community property laws may be founded in part on the esteem
society gives to the institution of marriage.5 3 Cohabitational relation-
52. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A
Proposal for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (1984).
53. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BALLINGER, A.B., A TREATISE ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
OF HUSBAND AND WIFE UNDER THE COMMUNITY ORGANICAL SYSTEM § 11, at 37-38 (1895).
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ships can never be analogous to community property marriage because
cohabitation is contradictory to the notion of community property
itself.54 Defenders of Lindsey's statutory analogy may claim that
Washington has not adopted community property law for cohabitating
couples, but has simply used those laws for guidance. In fact, the
cases frequently point out that cohabitation is not marriage.55
However, it is easy to lose sight of the idea that community property
law cannot directly apply to cohabitation.
For example, In re Marriage of Pearson-Maines,"6 a case where
the couple cohabitated before a brief marriage, the court fails to keep
distinct the idea that there can be no community property prior to
marriage. The case refers to community and separate property
throughout, without quotation marks or any other indication that
community property laws are used only by analogy. The Pearson-
Maines court even says, "it is appropriate to review the community
contributions and the transactions of the parties prior to their marriage
in July of 1988.""' In our judicial system that relies on the precedent
of prior court opinions, it is easy to see how cases like Pearson-Maines
The principle which lies at the foundation of the whole [community property] system
is, that whatever is acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and wife, shall be their
common property; the theory of the law being, that the marriage, in respect to property
acquired during its existence, is a community of which each spouse is a member, equally
contributing by his or her industry to its prosperity and possessing an equal right to
succeed to the property after its dissolution, in case one survives the other.
Id.
54. The proposition that cohabitation is contradictory to the notion of community property
itself was argued in the dissent to the leading Nevada cohabitation case, Western States Constr.
Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Nev. 1992) (Springer, J., dissenting). Nevada has a "just
and equitable" dissolution statute that is almost identical to WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080. The
Michoff majority ultimately concluded that a cohabitating couple could impliedly contract to hold
property as though it were community property, "in accord with the laws governing community
property." Id. at 1224.
Justice Springer's razor-sharp dissent somewhat sarcastically coined the term "Mishoff
Marriages." Id. at 1225. These "Mishoff Marriages," according to Justice Springer, conferred
upon the cohabitating couple statutory rights of beneficial ownership of property in spite of the
fact that no legal marriage existed. However, Justice Springer argued, "[i]t is the existence of
marriage that informs the 'beneficial ownership' known as community property. Community
property is marital property, and without marriage the term is meaningless." Id. at 1228-29.
Justice Springer also expressed concern that the majority opinion would have the effect of
encouraging informal marriages by letting cohabitants create community property-like interests
by agreement. Id. at 1225. Although Washington has not (yet) sanctioned the creation of
community property-like interests by agreement, Justice Springer's concern about encouraging
informal marriages is relevant in Washington as well.
55. E.g., Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 348-49, 898 P.2d at 835.
56. 70 Wash. App. 860, 855 P.2d 1210 (1993).
57. Id. at 865, 855 P.2d at 1214 (emphasis added).
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can contribute to the distortion of the idea that cohabitation is not
marriage, much like a bad game of "telephone.""8
Only one thing may be considered certain: even though social
attitudes about cohabitation have changed, within the legal sphere,
cohabitation and marriage cannot be considered so equal as to permit
the type of analogy in which the Lindsey court engaged. A nagging bit
of traditionalism must still exist. The people of Washington have yet
to demand the re-institution of common law marriage, the institution
of "living together" statutes, or the revision of the community property
statutes to include cohabitation as well as marriage. The Lindsey
decision does not set forth any argument as to why the Washington
Supreme Court is able to act in a way that makes cohabitational
property analogous to community property.
C. Interpreting Lindsey: Cases Between Lindsey and Connell
This section will look at the cases between Lindsey and Connell in
an attempt to find some guidance in interpreting Lindsey's just and
equitable dictate. The only thing that can be gleaned from these cases
is that Washington courts will not treat cohabitating couples like
married couples based solely on the status of living together-there
must be some sort of tangible contribution to the property claimed by
the cohabitant. Although the fact that mere status will not produce
property rights is interesting sociologically, this fact does little to
remedy the problems of scope in interpreting Lindsey. From analysis
of the cases between Lindsey and Connell, it is clear that the scope of
Lindsey is still up in the air.
In the period between Lindsey and Connell, a total of ten
Washington cases attempted to interpret and apply Lindsey's statutory
analogy in various cohabitational situations.5 9 Predictability seemed
58. "Telephone" is a child's game where the first child in a circle whispers a message into
the ear of the second child, and then the second child repeats that message in the ear of the third
child, and so on until the message comes full circle to the last child. Laughter then usually erupts
when the last child announces the message, which usually bears little, or no, resemblance to the
message the first child started around the circle.
59. Peffley-Warner v. Bowen, 113 Wash. 2d 243, 778 P.2d 1022 (1989); Davis v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 108 Wash. 2d 272, 737 P.2d 1262 (1987); Zion Constr., Inc. v. Gilmore,
78 Wash. App. 87, 895 P.2d 864 (1995); Pearson-Maines, 70 Wash. App. 860, 855 P.2d 1210;
In re Marriage of Hurd, 69 Wash. App. 38, 848 P.2d 185 (1993); Foster v. Thilges, 61 Wash.
App. 880, 812 P.2d 523 (1991); In re Marriage of Shannon, 55 Wash. App. 137, 777 P.2d 8
(1989); In re Marriage of DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. 695, 770 P.2d 638 (1989); Western
Community Bank v. Helmer, 48 Wash. App. 694, 740 P.2d 359 (1987); In re Marriage of Hilt,
41 Wash. App. 434, 704 P.2d 672 (1985) (Lindsey was decided during pendency of appeal in this
case. The court did not address Lindsey because the Creasman presumption had been rebutted
by evidence of intent that the property be owned jointly.).
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to be a key justification for Lindsey's overruling of Creasman. To have
predictability, cohabitants and their attorneys need to acquire some
idea as to the scope of the Lindsey analogy, both in extending the
analogy to other marital statutes and as to which parts of the "just and
equitable" dissolution statute apply by analogy.
The only perceivable trend since Lindsey is that Washington
courts will not extend this analogy to other marital statutes when a
cohabitant argues that he or she should be given the spousal status
merely because he or she was a cohabitant. For instance, an appellate
court refused to award attorney's fees to a cohabitant under RCW
26.09.140, which grants such fees to former spouses.60 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court similarly refused to grant unemployment
benefits to a woman who left employment to cohabitate, although such
benefits might have been available had she left her employment to
marry.6' Also, the Washington Supreme Court refused to treat a
surviving cohabitant the same as a surviving spouse under Washington
intestacy statutes for the purpose of obtaining Social Security bene-
fits. 62
Beyond this one identifiable rule in three of the ten cases, the
remaining seven cases do not serve to illuminate the scope of Lindsey.
Of those cases, two can be excluded from consideration because they
did not fall under Lindsey at all.63 The five remaining cases dealt
with a cohabitant's claim of right to property grounded in more than
the mere status of being a cohabitant. This type of claim occurs when
a cohabitant tangibly contributes, either with money or labor, to the
purchase or improvement of property during the cohabitation.
The first of these five cases was In re Marriage of DeHollander.
The Court of Appeals, Division 3, affirnmed the treatment of real estate
purchased by a cohabitant with his separate funds during the cohabita-
tional relationship like community property where the couple later
married.64 Next, in Foster v. Thilges, Division 1 ruled that real estate
purchased during a ten-year cohabitational relationship became just like
community property, affirming the trial court's use of the "just and
equitable" dissolution statute to divide the property.6 Just two years
60. Helmer, 48 Wash. App. at 699, 740 P.2d at 362.
61. Davis, 108 Wash. 2d at 278, 737 P.2d at 1266.
62. Peffley-Warner, 113 Wash. 2d at 252, 778 P.2d at 1027.
63. Hilt, 41 Wash. App. 434, 704 P.2d 672 (Lindsey was decided while Hilt was pending
appeal); Shannon, 55 Wash. App. 137, 777 P.2d 8 (the relationship was not considered a long-
term, stable, nonmarital relationship).
64. DeHollander, 53 Wash. App. at 701, 770 P.2d at 641.
65. Foster, 61 Wash. App. at 886, 812 P.2d at 526-27.
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later, in In re Marriage of Hurd, Division 1 held in a dissolution action
where the marriage had been preceded by a short period of cohabita-
tion, that the mere fact that property was purchased during cohabita-
tion did not transform separate property into community property.66
In the same year as Hurd, the same court decided In re Marriage of
Pearson-Maines.67 Pearson-Maines held that a residence acquired by
a woman prior to cohabitation and marriage remained her "separate"
property; any "community" improvements to the residence would first
be offset by the benefit the "community" received from using the
property and would then be a right of reimbursement in the "commu-
nity."6" The last case regarding the disposition of property accumula-
tions of a cohabitating couple decided prior to the Connell Supreme
Court case was Zion Construction, Inc. v. Gilmore;69 there, the
appellate court concluded that where the property was purchased with
one cohabitant's assets, but title was placed in both names and
payments were made from both salaries, it was like community
property according to Lindsey.7" However, the Zion court went on to
find that the characterization of the property did not matter because
the court had the power to make a just and equitable distribution and
use its wide discretion to determine what this meant.71
Other than the courts' refusals to allow statutory analogy based
purely on status, the cases between Lindsey and Connell are probably
insufficient to show the scope of Lindsey. One interesting note,
however, is that it appears that the courts, by limiting statutory
analogy to those cases where a remedy would be available through the
Creasman exceptions, may in fact be applying equity, then placing a
statutory fig leaf over that equity. This idea calls into question the
benefit of Lindsey's statutory analogy. Because we may feel that
marriage and cohabitation are socially the same, we may not approve
of treating them differently in the legal context. It seems impersonal
to use the same equitable remedies for cohabitants as used for business
partners, fiduciaries, or contracting parties. But if the courts are using
marital statutory analogy to bring legal doctrine in line with modem
social norms, this effort is misplaced. Statutory analogy compromises
legal predictability while gaining nothing in fairness over the older,
equity-based Creasman exceptions.
66. Hurd, 69 Wash. App. at 54, 848 P.2d at 195.
67. Pearson-Maines, 70 Wash. App. 860, 855 P.2d 1210.
68. Id. at 870, 855 P.2d at 1216.
69. Zion, 78 Wash. App. 87, 895 P.2d 864.
70. Id. at 89, 895 P.2d at 866-67.
71. Id. at 92-93, 895 P.2d at 867.
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IV. CONNELL AND BEYOND
The Washington Supreme Court's most recent decision on this
issue, Connell v. Francisco,72 demonstrates the inherent uncertainty in
the scope of Lindsey's statutory analogy. While Lindsey's goals of
equity and predictability are admirable, neither Lindsey nor Connell
does anything to promote those goals. Connell shows that Lindsey has
left the door wide open for judicial interpretation-judicial interpreta-
tion that will lead to unpredictability and a corresponding loss of
equity for cohabitating parties. This Part first summarizes Connell,
including: (1) the facts of Connell, (2) the appellate court's holding, (3)
the Washington State Supreme Court's holding, and (4) the current
state of the law after Connell. Then this Part measures Connell's
version of statutory analogy against Lindsey's goals, concluding that
Connell's interpretation of Lindsey does nothing to make decisions more
predictable or equitable in this area of the law. Finally, this Part
hypothesizes as to where Connell's version of statutory analogy could
lead, and concludes that the door has been left wide open to completely
analogize cohabitation to marriage.
A. Connell v. Francisco
In 1995, the Washington State Supreme Court authoritatively
rejected appellate courts' interpretation of Lindsey that the court was to
look at all of the property of the parties (both "separate" and "commu-
nity") to make a just and equitable distribution.73 Instead, Connell
held that only the property that would have been community property
had the parties been married would be before the court for a just and
equitable distribution.74
1. Facts of the Connell Case
Shannon Connell was a dancer in a stage show produced by
Richard Francisco. In 1983, Shannon moved to Las Vegas to live with
Richard. At that time, Shannon owned her clothing, her car, and a
leasehold interest in a New York apartment. Richard was substantially
better off financially, with net worth of approximately $1,300,000. His
assets included several companies, two of which, Prince Productions,
Inc. and Las Vegas Talent, Ltd., produced stage shows for hotels.
During the time the couple lived in Las Vegas, Shannon worked as a
72. 127 Wash. 2d 339, 898 P.2d 831.
73. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835.
74. Id.
[Vol. 20:543
Cohabitational Relationships
paid dancer in several stage shows. She also assisted Richard with his
businesses. Richard managed his companies and produced several
profitable stage shows.73
In 1985, Prince Productions purchased a bed and breakfast in
Washington, known as the Whidbey Inn. Shannon moved to
Whidbey Island to manage the Inn. Soon Richard joined her. For
two years Shannon managed the Inn without compensation. For one
year she received a salary of $400 per week. Meanwhile, Richard
produced another profitable stage show and purchased several tracts of
real property. Shannon did not contribute financially to the purchase
of any of this property and title was either in Richard's name, or in the
name of Prince Productions. 76
In 1990, the seven-year relationship ended. While Shannon's
assets had only increased slightly during the relationship, Richard's net
worth had more than doubled to $2,700,000. Shannon filed a lawsuit
seeking a just and equitable distribution of the property that was
acquired during their cohabitation. The trial court limited the property
subject to distribution to that which would have been community
property had the parties been married. The court held that the
property owned by each party prior to the relationship could not be
distributed. The trial court then required Shannon to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the property acquired during their
relationship would have been community property had the two
married. As a result, the only property characterized by the trial court
as "community" property was the increased value of Richard's pension
plan, half of which was distributed to Shannon. The trial court
concluded that Shannon had not met her burden of proof with respect
to the remaining property.77
2. Connell Appellate Court Decision
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding that only
property acquired during the relationship that would have been
community in character had the parties been married was subject to a
just and equitable distribution, and held that the "separate" property
could be distributed as well. Further, the Connell appellate court
asserted that any analogy to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute
75. Id. at 343-46, 898 P.2d at 832-34.
76. Id. at 345.
77. Id. at 345, 898 P.2d at 834.
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should include the statute's "flexible guidelines""8 to take into account
all of the circumstances in each case in order to provide equity. That
meant having all the property on the table, mirroring the requirement
of RCW 26.09.080 in dissolution actions.79 The Connell appellate
decision may be characterized as the "high-water mark" of interpreting
Lindsey. Although the Connell appellate decision was soon partially
reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, it demonstrated the
extent to which the Lindsey statutory analogy may be taken.
The Connell appellate court further discussed the application of
the community property presumption to assist in characterizing the
cohabitants' property as "separate" or "community." As applied to
marriages, the community property presumption provides that all
property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community
property unless rebutted by proof that it is the separate property of a
spouse.8" The Connell appellate court acknowledged that the question
of whether the community property presumption applied had never
been directly decided, but concluded "that the presumption cannot
rationally be severed from the obligation to divide property justly and
equitably by analogy according to the principles of RCW 26.09.080.
In large measure, application of RCW 26.09.080 in the meretricious
relationship context would be meaningless without the presump-
tion."81 This portion of the appellate court's opinion was affirmed by
the Washington Supreme Court, and has now become an off-shoot rule
to Lindsey.
3. Connell Supreme Court Decision
Richard petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for discretion-
ary review. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the
appellate court erred by imposing a community property-like presump-
tion to all property. A subissue was to what extent the "just and
equitable" dissolution statute governed the disposition of property after
a cohabitational relationship.
78. It is assumed that by "flexible guidelines" the Connell appellate court was referring to
the ability of a trial court in a dissolution action to look at all of the property (separate and
community), consider the future financial circumstances of the parties (including future earning
potential), and make an equitable distribution. This would include the trial court's ability to
award a spouse one community property asset while offsetting this award with an award to the
other spouse of another community property asset, or a mix of community and separate assets.
79. Connell, 74 Wash. App. at 316, 872 P.2d at 1156-57.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030; see, e.g., Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P.
398 (1892); In re Marriage of Martin, 32 Wash. App. 92, 645 P.2d 1148 (1982).
81. Connell, 74 Wash. App. at 318, 872 P.2d at 1157.
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The Washington Supreme Court found that the appellate court
erred in imposing a community property-like presumption to all
property.8 2 The court stated that a cohabitational relationship was
not the same as a marriage.8 3 The laws involving distribution of
marital property therefore did not directly apply to the division of
property following cohabitational relationships, but courts could look
toward those laws for guidance. 4 The court characterized the Lindsey
rule as a general rule requiring a just and equitable distribution of
property following a cohabitational relationship.85
The court next stated that portions, not all, of the "just and
equitable" dissolution statute may apply by analogy. Only property
acquired during the relationship should be before the trial court.8 6
The court further emphasized that there could only be community
property when there was a marriage; "[h]owever, only by treating the
property acquired in a meretricious relationship similarly can this
court's reversal of 'the Creasman presumption' be given effect. 87
The court feared that failure to apply a community property-like
presumption to the property acquired during the cohabitational
relationship would place on the nonacquiring partner the burden of
proving that the property would have been community property had
the couple been married. 8  This would overrule Lindsey and thus
reinstate Creasman.
4. Post-Connell State of the Law in Washington
After Connell, Washington law regarding property distributions
after cohabitational relationship is summarized as follows: There is
now a rebuttable community property-like presumption that applies to
all property acquired during the cohabitational relationship. This"community" property comes before the court for a just and equitable
distribution. The presumption operates regardless of the state of the
title. Further, the definitions in RCW 26.16.010-.030 of "separate"
and "community" can be applied by analogy.8 9 Also, where the
funds or services owned by both parties are used to increase "separate"
property equity or to maintain or increase the value of the other's
82. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 352, 898 P.2d at 837.
83. Id. at 348, 898 P.2d at 835.
84. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 835.
85. Id. at 347, 898 P.2d at 834-35.
86. Id. at 349, 898 P.2d at 836.
87. Id. at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 351-52, 898 P.2d at 836-37.
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"separate" property, there may arise a right of reimbursement in the"community." A court may, however, offset the "community's" right
of reimbursement against any reciprocal benefit received by the"community" for its use and enjoyment of the individually owned
property.90
B. Lindsey's Statutory Analogy a'la Connell
Given Lindsey's express goals that distribution of property after
cohabitational relationships produce equity and lead to predictability,
the next point for analysis is whether Connell's version of statutory
analogy fulfills these two goals.
Connell's version of Lindsey's "just and equitable" statutory
analogy is not an improvement for three reasons. First, Connell
analogizes to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute, but then fails
to use all of the governing principles of the statute, resulting in
confusion and a loss of any equity sought by the analogy. Second,
Connell, like Lindsey, fails to instruct how the "just and equitable"
dissolution statute should be applied, therefore leaving the door open
to further judicial interpretation. Third, Connell fails to adequately
justify the adoption of a community property-like presumption and the
use of other community property statutes. Connell does not give future
litigants or courts guidance on how to handle the practical difficulties
of applying community property statutes. In sum, Connell's version of
Lindsey adds to the unpredictability of distributions of cohabitational
property while adding nothing to improve equity.
Connell applied Lindsey in two new ways: (1) it limited the
analogy to the "just and equitable" dissolution statute to the property
that would have been community property had the couple been
married, and (2) it adopted a community property-like presumption
that all property acquired during the cohabitational relationship was"community" property. In furtherance of the community property-like
presumption, the Connell court called for the use of the community
property statutes (RCW 26.16.010-.030) to define "separate" and"community," and allowed a right of reimbursement in the "communi-
ty" for the increase in value of "separate" property assets during the
relationship.91 When these two interpretations are put up against
Lindsey's goals of equity and predictability, it becomes apparent that
Connell's version of statutory analogy does not satisfy Lindsey.
90. Id.
91. Connell, 127 Wash. 2d at 351, 898 P.2d at 836-37.
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1. Limiting the Analogy to "Community" Property
Connell's limitation of the "just and equitable" analogy to that
property that would have been "community" property had the couple
been married does not meet Lindsey's goal of predictability.
Justice Utter's dissent in Connell illustrates the initial arguments
against Connell's partial-analogy rule.92 Justice Utter believed that
this rule would lead to uncertain application and would in fact interfere
with the Lindsey requirement of a just and equitable distribution.93
Advocating for a "simple rule" that would be easy to apply, Justice
Utter supported the Connell appellate court's interpretation of Lindsey,
which required that all property was to be before the court. 94  This
basic argument was that if a court is going to analogize to a statute, it
should analogize to all of it, not just a portion.
Justice Utter agreed with the majority that Lindsey did not
interpret the "just and equitable" dissolution statute to include
cohabitational relationships; however, Justice Utter viewed Lindsey as
adopting a common law rule applicable to cohabitants which mirrored
the provisions of the statute. 95 Justice Utter argued that the "cf."
signal preceding the Lindsey court's citation to the "just and equitable"
dissolution statute is consistent with his and the Connell appellate
court's view that all property be subject to a just and equitable
distribution. He posited that although the type of relationship
(cohabitation) is different than marriage, the governing principles of the"just and equitable" dissolution statute should be the same. However,
if neither the type of relationship nor the governing principles were the
same, Justice Utter argued, the "just and equitable" dissolution statute
would not be "sufficiently analogous to lend support," and that the
Lindsey holding would be unfounded. 96
Justice Utter did not explicitly state what may be logically inferred
as the next step in his thought process: because Lindsey is not
unfounded, the "just and equitable" dissolution statute's governing
principles apply to cohabitational relationships in the same manner as
they apply to marriage. However, it is asking a lot to assume that
Lindsey is not unfounded. It has already been shown above that the
Lindsey court was not founded in basing its holding on the need to
92. Id. at 353, 898 P.2d at 837-38 (Utter J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 353, 898 P.2d at 837 (Utter J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 353, 898 P.2d at 838 (Utter J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 354, 898 P.2d at 838 (Utter J., dissenting).
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overrule Creasman. Why should it be granted that the Lindsey court
was on solid ground when it used the "cf." signal to adopt RCW
26.09.080 by analogy? It would seem that if the foundation were firm,
the Lindsey court would have been more explicit as to how the "just
and equitable" dissolution statute should be applied.
2. Community Property-Like Presumption
The Connell court also fails to adequately justify why it was
appropriate to adopt the community property-like presumption, use
RCW 26.16.010-.030 for the definitions of "separate" and "communi-
ty," and allow a right of reimbursement in the "community" for the
increase in value of "separate" property assets during the relationship.
These are not rules specifically authorized by Lindsey. The Connell
court's only justification is that without a community property-like
presumption, the Lindsey court's overruling of the Creasman presump-
tion would have no effect and place the burden of proof on the
nonacquiring partner.97 This proposition makes no sense without
adopting some of the fundamental tenets of community property: that
when two people are legally married they form a partnership called the
marital community, that the interest of the marital community is
presumed to be more important than the individual interests of the
community members, and that the spouse asserting his or her
individual property interests over the interests of the community bears
the burden of proving why that interest should be sustained over the
community's interest.9" For cohabitating couples, an essential
ingredient fundamental to community property is missing: legal
marriage.
Because legal marriage is the one element required for a communi-
ty property relationship,99 any analogy to a community property-like
presumption in cohabitational relationships lacks foundation. As
discussed in Part III, the value placed on marriage by our society is at
the base of our community property statutes, so much so that we are
willing to accept a certain amount of inequity to third parties dealing
with a married couple. This is not true for cohabitation. Because the
fundamental bases of marriage and cohabitation differ, the two are not
analogous. Additionally, the practical difficulties of analogizing
cohabitation with a marriage (including determining exactly when to
97. Id. at 350, 898 P.2d at 836.
98. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
DESKBOOK § 3.13 (2d ed. 1989).
99. Id. § 1.10.
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begin the analogy, determining if the analogy is retroactive once it is
established, and determining which situations merit analogy) present
an additional layer of unpredictability to the already inherently
unpredictable legal state of cohabitation.
Even if the Lindsey court's holding had been well intended,
Connel demonstrates that statutory analogy makes the law surrounding
property disposition after cohabitation more unpredictable. It has
already been demonstrated that the courts will decline to interpret
Lindsey's analogy as meaning that cohabitation is, in effect, the same
as marriage (e.g., attorney's fees in dissolution actions, unemployment
benefits for leaving a job to get married, or intestate devolution).
However, Connell demonstrates that Washington courts will willingly
extend some aspects of Lindsey's statutory analogy to treat cohabitation
the same as marriage, including community property-like presump-
tions, statutory definitions for "community" and "separate," and the
right of reimbursement in the "community." So the question becomes:
Why is it appropriate to treat unmarried cohabitants the same as if
they were married for property distribution on dissolution, and
inappropriate to treat them as married for other purposes? The only
answer to this apparent contradiction is that the Washington Supreme
Court is attempting, albeit in an ad hoc manner, to correct the wrongs
that have been done to cohabitants seeking property distributions.
This effort, most recently evident in Connell, has caused more
difficulties than it has solved. One of the primary purposes of Lindsey,
making the law respecting property dispositions at the end of cohabita-
tional relationships more predictable, has not been fulfilled by Connell.
In fact, Connell, and the cases preceding it, demonstrate a decided lack
of predictability in defining the Lindsey rules. It is also arguable that
the Washington Supreme Court has attempted to provide cohabitating
couples with equitable treatment. But by adding another layer of
analysis to the already existing equitable doctrines, the Court has
instead increased the inherent unpredictability of cohabitation. This
added unpredictability reduces effective planning for cohabitating
couples and requires that each situation be looked at anew by the
courts. Litigation is expensive and time consuming, and brings with
it emotional costs.
C. Beyond Connell
What comes after Connell regarding property distributions after
cohabitation should be scrutinized to determine whether analogy to the
marriage statutes is practical or compatible with public policy. A
critical look at possible future decisions under Connell leads to the
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conclusion that if the court continues on its present course, the goals
of Lindsey will not be served. The rationale for this conclusion falls
into two general categories: (1) it is not practical to continue the
analogy to the marriage statutes, and (2) public policy favoring
marriage requires that there be a distinction between the treatment of
marriage and the treatment of cohabitation.
1. Practical Considerations
The practical effect of Connell is that it will lead to less predict-
ability. For instance, there is no clear moment when a relationship
becomes a "stable, continuous, family-type relationship" which will be
subject to the community property-like presumptions. The test for
determining this point has changed with case law. Prior to Lindsey
there was some indication that the length of the relationship would be
the critical factor. However, the cohabitation in Lindsey was only two
years prior to marriage; the Lindsey court seemed to discount the time
factor considerably. It may be that the court thought it was significant
that the couple later married. This leads to the conclusion that later
marriage is a factor to be considered favorably in determining if the
relationship is a "stable, continuous, family-type relationship."
Not only is it very difficult to determine the exact point at which
the courts will apply the marriage statutes by analogy, but it is also
unclear whether, and on what basis, the marriage analogy will be
applied retroactively to the beginning of the relationship. It would
seem that cohabitational relationships sometimes do not start at a
certain date. For example, a couple may maintain separate residences
and stay portions of the week at one residence or the other. It would
seem from Lindsey that if this couple later married, it is possible for a
court to retroactively treat them as cohabitating under Connell's version
of marital analogy.
This same hypothetical couple may not get married at all, but
sustain this relationship for many years. Whether a relationship is
terminated by death or dissolution may also be a critical factor.
Perhaps the parties view themselves as having a "stable, continuous
family-type relationship," but each cohabitant has a different view
about when this relationship began. The possible hypothetical
situations are many, and the solutions will have to be looked at on a
case-by-case basis.
A court evaluating such a situation under Connell would have to
engage in the following analysis. The first step would be for the court
to evaluate the relationship to determine if it was a "stable, continuous,
family-type relationship." If it was, then the court would apply the
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Connell rules. Property acquired during the relationship is presumably"community," and the court could use RCW 26.16.010-.030 to
determine the definitions of "separate" and "community." Then the
court would make a "just and equitable" distribution of that "commu-
nity" property.
However, suppose that the cohabitating couple participated in a
business together, titled all of the property in the woman's name in
order to avoid an increase in the man's child support payments to a
former spouse, or incurred a tort liability to a third party during the
cohabitation. Further, suppose the relationship lasted over fifteen years
and the woman, who contributed to the success of the relationship as
a "housewife," is unable to support herself and requires spousal
support while gaining job training. All of these issues require
something more than Connell's statutory analogy in order to have
equity.
The situations involving cohabitants are unpredictable by nature.
Unfortunately, there is little that can be done to remedy this, short of
legislation adopting common law marriage or a cohabitation statute.
Washington courts have already found instances where they will not
allow a marital statutory analogy. Cohabitants cannot count on being
treated as married couples in all instances.
Finally, it must be considered that because cohabitants may
reasonably expect their particular situations to be viewed favorably by
a court, there will be a flood of these sorts of cases, thus increasing the
risk of inconsistent decisions by lower courts. Unfortunately, Connell
will offer no clear guidance and the danger may become that the
Washington Supreme Court, in trying to justify Connell's existence,
will do more harm than equity.
2. General Public Policy Considerations
Aside from the practical considerations discussed above, one
cannot ignore general public policy considerations, that is, how we feel
as a society about treating cohabitation similarly to marriage. Because
these considerations were discussed above in Part III, they will merely
be summarized briefly here as a reminder.
First, the foundational idea that Washington's community
property law requires marriage demonstrates that the Lindsey and
Connell statutory analogies are completely unfounded. Cohabitational
relationships are not analogous to community property marriage
because cohabitation is contradictory to the notion underlying
Washington's community property statute itself. Second, we do not
hold cohabitation in the same esteem as we hold marriage. Finally, it
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is contrary to our system of government to allow courts to decide
whether cohabitation should be analogous to marriage. This is a social
normative determination that is more properly made through the
political system.
V. CONCLUSION: SEEING THE ANSWER THAT IS
RIGHT BEFORE Us
Hopefully, this Comment has persuaded the reader that the
Creasman presumption was somewhat ineffectual in the field of
property distributions after cohabitation. Unfortunately, the Creasman
presumption was very effectual in one way: It became so normatively
distasteful that it served as a battle cry to lead the court down its
current path of statutory analogy. However, if it is not a good idea to
perpetuate the statutory analogy that Lindsey began and Connell
furthered, we are still left with the unanswered question of how
cohabitational relationships should be treated by the courts.
Because of the varied nature of cohabitational relationships, there
is no one answer to that question. The most flexible solution is for the
courts to use the concepts of equity within the confines of the existing
equitable doctrines, which have been applied as the exceptions to the
Creasman presumption. If the Creasman presumption is disregarded,
and if the cases in the Creasman era are examined based on how they
were actually decided, it is possible to conclude that equity already
existed, and that statutory analogy was (and is) unnecessary.
In each case where a Creasman exception was used to provide an
equitable solution for the cohabitants, the cohabitation situation
differed factually, just as situations between noncohabitating people
would differ. Applying the Creasman exceptions worked because the
parties and the courts drew upon a large body of law and fit that law
to the particular facts of each cohabitation. Although predictability
would not be absolute, using the equitable doctrines provides more
predictability than statutory analogy. As discussed above, predictabili-
ty is inhibited in a statutory analogy approach because the scope of the
analogy is not clear. Conversely, the scope of the equitable doctrines
is relatively clear, and it usually is a matter of deciding which doctrine
fits the factual situation.
Further, using the equitable doctrines does not intrude on the
legal relationship of marriage. No special relationship is necessary for
the equitable doctrines to apply. For some, the idea that the cohabita-
tional relationship would not be specially valued is a problem. These
people do not like using the same doctrines that are commonly used in
business; to them, cohabitation is a personal relationship, whereas
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business relationships imply coldness, money, and calculation. The
response to this complaint is that it is better to sacrifice a bit of
normative comfort than to sacrifice flexibility and predictability by
wedging cohabitation into an ill-fitting statutory analogy.
